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THE U.S. COMMERCIAL LAUNCH SERVICES INDUSTRY 
AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION
Dennis R. Dunbar & Lee R. Scherer
General Dynamics 
Commercial Launch Services
Abstract
This paper discusses the threat to our fledgling commercial ELV 
industry of current and anticipated foreign competition, which is 
generally subsidized by their governments. It considers actions that 
might be taken by U.S. industry members to improve their 
competitive position and steps that might be considered by the U.S. 
government to support this industry so important to the U.S. national 
strategic posture.
Introduction
From the birth of the space age until about 1980, the United States 
had a monopoly on space launches in the free world. The decision by 
the United States to cease purchasing expendable launch vehicles 
and place all of our launch needs on the Space Shuttle was at least 
one fundamental point in the decision of the European community to 
develop its own ELV - the Ariane. Although Ariane had the usual 
infant mortality problems, it was soon evident that this European 
vehicle would be a formidable competitor for the launching of 
commercial satellites. The negative effect on our balance of trade 
could be significant.
In 1983 the decision was made to allow privatization of the 
government - developed launch vehicles and the U.S. commercial 
launch services industry was born. The brief history of this industry 
has been one of continuing and difficult competition.
Throughout this paper, the commercial launch services industry is 
defined in a narrow sense as those larger launch vehicles originally 
developed under government contract. Launch services using 
improved versions of such vehicles are being marketed by General
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Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, and Martin Marietta to foreign and 
commercial customers, primarily for communication satellites. 
There is another segment of this industry which will not be covered 
in this paper. It consists primarily of entrepreneurs developing 
smaller vehicles, generally for low earth orbit missions. Members 
of this group include Space Services, E Prime, Conatec, American 
Rocket, Orbital Sciences, and most recently LTV. Their future 
depends on the need for smaller satellites by government and 
commercial customers. Recent increase in interest within the 
government for light satellites has brought more promise to this 
segment.
Industry Phases
Competition to our commercial ELV industry can be divided into 
rather distinct phases as follows:
Phase I 83-86 Space Shuttle
Phase II 87-88 Ariane
Phase III 89 Long March
Phase IV 90+ TBD
Phase I - Space Shuttle
In order to attract the maximum number of commercial customers to 
the Shuttle, which would keep the launch rate high and the cost per 
flight down, a pricing formula was established which was very 
attractive to the satellite owners. The Ariane was being offered at 
similar prices with the backing of the European member nations. It 
was a price war in which the U.S. commercial industry could not 
participate since the cost for building one of our vehicles was much 
more than the price offered by either Shuttle or Ariane.
The U.S. commercial industry could not compete with its own 
government.
Phase II Ariane
The Challenger tragedy was followed some months later by a 
Presidental directive that the Shuttle would no longer carry 
commercial payloads, with a small number of exceptions. The price 
of Ariane increased, due in part to a weakened dollar, and our 
industry (Figure 1) could compete on a more or less equal footing.
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This phase has brought modest success and each of the companies 
have been able to obtain some firm contracts. In early 1989 the 
total number of commercial contracts (non-DoD) is 21, and of these 
11 are non-U.S. which represents a significant positive balance of 
trade. This degree of success has been due in part to the fact that 
many of the Shuttle customers moved quickly to Ariane after the 
Presidential decision. This coupled with the two Ariane failures in 
1986 and the resulting hiatus left the Ariane manifest very full.
Ariane is a tough competitor. The launch rate over the past twelve 
months is enviable. Ten launches have been scheduled in 1989. 
Recently a buy of 50 Ariane IV vehicles was announced.
This phase can be characterized as a wide-open free enterprise 
competition. The playing field is somewhat tilted in that 
Arianespace enjoys more government support than do the U.S. 
companies. These are in such areas as government funded R&D, and 
other financial and insurance support. For example, the R&D to 
develop Ariane 4 and Ariane 5 were funded by the European Space 
Agency (ESA) and is not recovered in prices charged to commercial 
customers. The R&D to develop Atlas I, II, HA, and MAS were all 
paid for by General Dynamics and must be recovered through 
commercial sales. As another example, we must carry $500 Million 
third party liability insurance with the U.S. government covering the 
next $1.5 Billion. Arianespace is required to have about $70 Million 
insurance with the French government covering all above that. A 
very important difference in financial risk is in the area of launch 
failure. If Ariane fails due to operational problems, Arianespace is 
responsible. If the failure is due to a design problem, then ESA 
covers the failure analysis and corrective actions. With the third 
stage engine problems that occurred in 1986, media reports placed 
the costs at some $300 Million. If U.S. companies have a failure of a 
commercial vehicle, each company is responsible for all of the 
costs.
During this phase General Dynamics assessed the market and the 
competition and made the decision to proceed with the production of 
18 Atlas I vehicles when we did not have a single order. We knew 
that we could compete with Arianespace only through a quantity buy. 
This is the kind of risk-taking measures that the commercial 
business requires if one is to be successful. Later we were awa ded 
the MLV-2 contract by the Air Force and we further increased our 
exposure by committing to production of commercial variances of
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this larger vehicle. There is no question that we are committed to 
full competition with Ariane and with our American peers.
Phase III - Long March
In mid-1988 Aussat held a competition for its next generation of 
satellites. The three U.S. spacecraft companies bid as well as a 
European team of British Aerospace and Matra. Hughes was selected 
as winner. The Australians asked Hughes to obtain export licenses 
to ship their two spacecraft to China for launch on Long March, since 
the launch costs were only about 1/3 as much as those of any U.S. 
launch provider or Ariane. At the same time a consortium called 
Asiasat, who owns the recovered Westar 6 spacecraft, asked Hughes 
to obtain an export license for that satellite.
Whether or not such licenses should be granted and, if so, under what 
conditions, then became a prime subject for debate within many 
departments of the Administration and on the Hill. Figure 2 shows 
that the Chinese are developing a family of launch vehicles that 
encompass a very broad spectrum of payloads.
The U.S. industry's argument against Long March can be summarized 
in four distinct categories:
1. Inconsistency of National Policy - The Administration and 
Congress had strongly urged the U.S. companies to enter the 
commercial arena. We have subsequently all made major capital 
investments. Now, before we have even made our first 
commercial launch, a different policy allowing China, a non- 
market economy, entry into this market can serve to kill the 
industry established by the earlier policy.
2. Negative effect on national security.
(a) A major agrument for government support of the commercial 
ELV industry initially was that it constituted a "reserve 
fleet" in the event that one or more Defense vehicle programs 
are grounded. Long March entry will likely cause drop out of 
one or more of the U.S. companies decreasing or eliminating 
such a back-up.
(b) A concurrent commercial industry reduces the cost of launch 
services to the Air Force. For the MLV-2 competition, we
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were able to show that our having embarked on a commercial 
program resulted in a substantial savings to the Air Force.
(c) The Long March vehicle required to launch Aussat must be of 
twice the performance of the existing vehicle. Providing the 
incentive for the growth of a potential weapon system by a 
factor of two is certainly not in the best interest of our 
national security.
3. Technology Transfer - The U.S. is far ahead of the Chinese in 
satellite technology. Integration of a satellite on a launch 
vehicle requires exchange of substantial technical information. 
Under the Aussat contract there are significant penalties for 
schedule delays. The U.S. satellite company will have a strong 
motivation to assist with problems that arise in development of 
this growth vehicle. This is not only with techical problems, but 
in management techniques and documentation requirements that 
we have learned over the past 30 years - often the hard way.
We know that satellites can remain essentially intact if a launch 
vehicle is destroyed early in the launch phase. Many here 
remember the OTS launch on Delta in 1977. The spacecraft was 
recovered and remained on display at ESTEC in Europe for some 
time. There have been similar occurrences with military 
payloads. Recovery by the Chinese of such a U.S. satellite would 
be a major technology gain for them.
4. Unfair Trade Practices - A capitalistic country cannot compete 
with a non-market economy whose prime interests are prestige, 
technology and obtaining of hard currency. A controlled economy 
can charge any price it chooses. If there are no restrictions PRC 
can capture as much of the market as their production 
capabilities allow.
Our arguments were accepted by many, but also opposed by many who 
believe in a free trade policy for this country and that market forces 
should prevail. Aussat threatened to reconsider its offer to Hughes 
if the licenses were not approved, so loss of the U.S. business had to 
be considered. There were foreign policy implications about which 
we can only guess but obviously the U.S. wishes to better its 
relations with the PRC and we know the Chinese placed a high 
priority on gaining approval for launching of these satellites.
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The issue had to be elevated to the very top. In November 1988 the 
President approved the granting of export licenses for the three 
satellites subject to certain conditions. There had to be assurances 
that there would be no technology transfer; the PRC had to sign the 
liability treaties that other nations have signed; and there had to be 
an agreement to "prevent possible unfair Chinese pricing or trade 
practices. 11 The first two points were concluded quickly. The last 
was much more difficult and the agreement was not signed until late 
January.
Some major conditions in the agreement are that the Chinese may be 
given export licenses for as many as nine launches over the six year 
period 1989 - 1994. Their price and terms and conditions must be 
won a par11 with those of western launchers. They cannot charge 
promotional prices except for the first successful launch of a new 
vehicle. Their commitments must be spread proportionally over the 
six-year period.
Monitoring of this agreement by our government will not be easy. 
Probably most difficult will be the determination on what pricing 
*on a par" means since this requires the gathering 'of proprietary
which companies may or may not be willing to share.
In any event, today the U.S. companies must not only compete with an 
aggressive and capable Arianespace; but also with PRC, a non- 
market economy, with whom an already thin market must be shared.
Phase IV - TBD
The danger with the Long March decision is the precedence that it 
sets. The U.S. has used the export licenses as an instrument of
foreign policy.. What happens if the same process is requested by the 
USSR for Proton launches? Today there is a strong edict against 
exporting, of U.S. spacecraft into the Soviet Union. Suppose the 
Soviets launch from, outside the Soviet Union', such as from' Cape 
York? This certainly reduces the technology transfer issue. Or 
suppose Proton Is to another organization in. the free world to 
launch? What then would our policy on export of U.S. 
be?
The USSR has an awesome launch capability which could
the commercial market. The relationship our 'two countries
may or may not soon the that would be allowed' to
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launch U.S. spacecraft. But there are other competitors coming down 
the road, Japan followed possibly by others like Brazil, India, and 
Israel.
The Long March decision with a quantity standard was cartelization. 
We have started dividing up the pie. Each new entry will want its 
fair share.
Phase IV may determine whether there is a commercial ELV industry 
at all, or whether our commercial satellite industry will be 
completely dependent on foreign launch services.
Conclusion
Where is this all going to lead? The answer is unclear at this point 
in time. There are certain things that our industry must do to 
survive:
1. We must recognize that we are in a commercial business with 
aggressive foreign competition for whom there are elements of 
national assistance that can probably never be completely 
irradicated.
2. To compete we have to take risks which were unheard of with our 
comfortable government contracts of the past. If General 
Dynamics had not committed to produce 18 vehicles without a 
single order there is no telling what our status would be today.
3. We have to aggressively seek ways of reducing costs while still 
maintaining or improving our high reliability. Arianespace has 
just announced a 50 vehicle $3 Billion production order. That is a 
tremendous industrial base over which to spread costs.
4. We have to do a continuing and effective job of convincing 
Congress and the Administration of the importance of maintaining 
a viable commercial launch services industry and seek support 
where required.
But no actions that we can take may prove sufficient to keep us in 
the business without our own government's support. In discussions 
with various Departments before the Long March decision, we found 
a number of free trade advocates. One stated bluntly "If the Chinese 
price for Long March in only 1/3 as much as U.S. industry's price it
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sounds like you folks could use a little competition." This attitude 
completely ignores the fact that Chinese workers are paid 20 to 50 
dollars per month. Or that President Reagan has stated that a viable 
commercial ELV industry is vital to our national security. Or that if
we lose the ELV industry the satellite industry will surely follow.
From our government;
1. We need a priority effort in the establishment of the legendary
international 'level playing field 11 for the industry. Discussions 
have been held for the last three years with Arianespace with 
little progress.
2. We need firm quick reactions against Chinese violations of the 
Long March Agreement, which calls for pricing on a par with 
western^ launchers and proportional distribution of the 
commitments over the six year period of the agreement, The 
export license process in controlled by the State Department. 
Monitoring of the agreement is done by the U.S. Trade 
Representative. The only real club we have against IPIRC 
violations is the denial or revoking of export licenses, We have 
one example in our industry of a claim of unfair trade practices 
by TCI against Arianesapce. The procedure took 18 months. If 
export license approvals were to continue' while deliberations 
over agreement violations are underway over such a period, we 
are liable to be out of business before a finding is ever reached.
3. We need an unwavering stance by our government against allowing 
entry of the USSR into the international market. There is no way 
any of us can compete against a non-market economy who is
launching 90 vehicles a year;
Without our Industry's own extensive eff ort and dedication and 
without the U.S. government's backing it is fair to say that the 
history of the U.S. commercial ELV industry will be very brief.
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